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Additivity and Complementarity in External Technology 
Sourcing: The Added Value of Corporate Venture Capital 
Investments 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Innovating firms often invest in a number of different technology projects, in 
different stages of development, using a wide range of distinct technology sourcing 
modes, such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, and mergers and acquisitions. 
Recently, firms have also gained an increasing awareness of the potential benefits of 
corporate venture capital investments. This paper investigates the particular role of 
corporate venture capital investments in the technology-sourcing portfolio of firms. 
More specifically, we focus on the extent to which corporate venture capital 
investments are additive or complementary to other modes of technology sourcing 
when explaining the innovative performance of firms. The results indicate that 
corporate venture capital investments are particularly beneficial for the innovative 
performance of firms when they are used in combination with other technology 
sourcing modes. 
 
 
MANAGERIAL RELEVANCE STATEMENT 
The results of this study show that combining CVC investments with non-equity 
alliances, equity alliances and M&As positively affects the innovation rates of the 
investing firms. This implies that managers must carefully design their external 
sourcing portfolio. Particularly with an increasing interest nowadays for the use of 
CVC investments, managers need to be aware of the fact that CVC investments in 
early stage technologies are mostly beneficial when used as part of a broader 
technology-sourcing portfolio and in combination with alliances and acquisitions of 
technologies that have already been further developed into marketable innovations. 
This suggests that firms should think about external technology sourcing as a 
portfolio of investments, which requires a more centralized approach towards 
investment decisions. This calls for a portfolio approach to external technology 
acquisition in general and to CVC investment research in particular.  
 
Keywords: external technology sourcing, open innovation, corporate venture capital 
investments, strategic alliances, M&As, complementarity
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past years companies have started to open up their innovation process 
(Chesbrough, 2003; Christensen et al., 2005; Laursen and Salter, 2006). As a 
consequence, the external acquisition of knowledge has become a central part of 
firms’ corporate strategy. Rather than making ad-hoc investments in external 
technology acquisition, the innovation strategy of firms nowadays is more likely to 
follow a portfolio approach to the external sourcing of technologies. An increasing 
number of authors have called for an integrated perspective on external technology 
sourcing in order to account for the interrelationships that exist among technology 
sourcing modes (Belderbos et al., 2006; Katila et al., 2008; Parise and Casher, 2003). 
Using a portfolio approach allows innovating firms to spread their investments along 
a broader range of technology projects, in different stages of development. This also 
implies that firms use a variety of technology sourcing mechanisms to target these 
different types of resources. In the past, strategic alliances and M&As have received 
a lot of attention in the literature as mechanisms to spur the innovative performance 
of firms. More recently, another type of technology sourcing has emerged: corporate 
venture capital (CVC) investments. CVC investments are minority equity 
investments in young, start-up firms and during recent years, these types of 
investments have received increased attention both in business as well as in academia 
(e.g. Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005; Dushnitsky and Lavie, 2008; Wadhwa and Kotha, 
2006). 
 Prior studies focusing on the relationship between CVC investments and 
innovative performance have shown that CVC investments have a positive effect on 
the subsequent patenting rates of investing firms (e.g. Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). 
However, the explanation of these studies on the benefits of CVC investments is 
limited to a certain extent. After all, most large diversified companies do not limit 
their sourcing strategies to one or two technology sourcing modes. They rather set up 
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a portfolio of innovation projects ranging all the way from more incremental to high-
risk, radical innovations. To cover this broad range of innovation projects, firms use a 
variety of distinct sourcing modes, each with its own characteristics, advantages and 
management challenges. Thus, in order to fully explain the effect of CVC 
investments on innovative performance, it is important to include a more 
comprehensive set of technology sourcing modes that are used by these firms. 
Nevertheless, the role of CVC investments within the technology-sourcing portfolio 
of firms has been largely unaddressed in prior research (notable exceptions are Keil 
et al., 2008; Schildt et al., 2005).  
 In response to this research gap, the current study examines the effect of using 
multiple sourcing strategies on a company's subsequent innovative performance. 
Although the focus is on a broad array of external technology sourcing modes, 
particular attention will be paid to the added value of CVC investments. Because 
CVC investments are likely to be used next to the more traditional modes for external 
technology sourcing, we argue that the effects of CVC investments cannot be 
estimated by looking at them in isolation. In fact, the actual benefits of CVC 
investments are likely to be dependent on the overall sourcing portfolios of firms. 
Therefore, this paper focuses on the complementarity between CVC investments on 
the one hand, and strategic alliances and M&As on the other hand, when explaining 
the innovative performance of firms. Although prior studies have looked at 
complementarity effects of external technology sourcing (e.g. Arora and 
Gambardella, 1990; Belderbos et al., 2006; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006), they 
have not yet explicitly linked the nature of the interaction between CVC investments 
and other technology sourcing modes to innovation. We argue that CVC investments 
are additive to other modes of external technology sourcing, because they all target 
different types of knowledge. Additionally, we argue that CVC investments are 
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complementary to the other technology sourcing modes because of the knowledge 
and experience spillovers associated with external knowledge acquisition. 
 As such, this paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, as 
discussed above, we incorporate a broader set of technology sourcing modes that can 
be used to source technologies externally and thereby may increase the innovative 
performance of companies. By discussing and empirically testing the combined 
effects of non-equity alliances, equity alliances, M&As and CVC investments on the 
innovative performance of firms in one single model, this paper adds to the 
increasing body of research into portfolio management and alliance portfolios in 
particular (e.g. McGill and Santoro, 2009; Parise and Casher, 2003). Second, since 
CVC investments have become a popular way to access external knowledge, this 
paper shows whether and to what extent this type of investment serves as a 
complement to other external sourcing strategies for improving firms' innovative 
performance. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we will discuss the 
role of external knowledge acquisition in explaining the innovative performance of 
firms. We will pay particular attention to the effects of corporate venture capital 
investments in combination with investments in strategic alliances and M&As. 
Second, we will discuss the concepts of additivity and complementarity, explaining 
why corporate venture capital is not only additive to other modes for technology 
sourcing but also complementary. Next, we will empirically test our hypotheses using 
a panel dataset of external sourcing behavior of innovating firms. Finally, in the 
discussion section, we will present and discuss the results and indicate how future 
research can build upon the conclusions of this study. 
 
BACKGROUND 
External knowledge sourcing and innovation 
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Companies that have decided to source knowledge externally can choose between a 
broad range of technology sourcing modes that they can employ for that purpose. 
Researchers have studied the impact of different external modes on the innovation 
performance of companies. Several studies have focused on the effect of CVC (e.g. 
Wadhwa and Kotha, 2006), equity and non-equity alliances (e.g. Stuart, 2000) and 
M&As (e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2001) on firms’ innovation performance. However, 
even studies that consider two modes to acquire external technology tend to examine 
them independently. In turn, we consider these different sourcing modes 
simultaneously and study whether a portfolio with a diversified set of different 
external technology acquisition modes leads to superior technological performance 
compared to firms that rely heavily on one mode to source external technology.  
 
Technology alliances and acquisitions 
Traditionally, mergers and acquisitions have been regarded as the primary way for 
companies to grow and to obtain additional resources. When sourcing external ideas 
through a merger or acquisition, the acquired resources are internalized in the 
investing firm. Thus, the resources obtained are accumulated to or integrated with the 
resources that were already present. The general assumption is that through 
economies of scope and scale, this enlarged bundle or resources makes more efficient 
production possible and should thus have a positive impact on firm performance 
(Lubatkin, 1983). In addition, M&As are likely to increase innovative capabilities of 
the acquirer because they raise the overall R&D budget (De Man and Duysters, 
2005). Moreover, technology buying might speed up the capability process because a 
firm instantly gets access to technology instead of having to develop it from scratch. 
 Despite these apparent advantages, prior research has shown mixed results for 
the overall effect of M&As on the investing company's innovative performance. For 
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example, Hitt et al. (1991) found a negative relationship between R&D related 
acquisitions and patent intensity, whereas others found positive effects depending on 
the nature of the M&As under study. Ahuja and Katila (2001) point towards the fact 
that non-technological acquisitions are likely not to provide technological inputs and 
hence cannot be expected to increase the innovative output. In a similar vein, other 
studies revealed positive effects only for related M&As (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 
2002; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). 
 Although M&As are still a popular way for firms to achieve growth, less 
integrated forms of technology sourcing have also gained ground. Strategic alliances, 
such as non-equity R&D agreements and joint ventures, have become more important 
vehicles for knowledge acquisition during the last two decades. Strategic alliances 
can roughly be described as ‘cooperative efforts in which two or more separate 
organizations, while maintaining their own corporate identities, join forces to share 
reciprocal inputs’ (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002) and can be divided into equity and 
non-equity alliances (Inkpen, 1998; Zollo et al., 2002). Equity alliances involve the 
transfer of equity, for instance through the creation of a new organizational entity 
(joint venture), whereas non-equity alliances do not require the use of equity 
investments. Despite the possible risks that are associated with strategic alliances, 
such as free-riding and opportunistic behavior (Gulati, 1998), the main advantage of 
strategic alliances and joint ventures as opposed to M&As is the sharing of costs and 
risks, which makes them particularly attractive in turbulent environments. Sharing the 
costs and risks connected to R&D with a partner can be regarded to as an effective 
way to manage the uncertainty surrounding this process (Hagedoorn, 1993). Besides, 
strategic alliances allow the partners to access only part of each others’ resources, 
which is especially valuable when not all the resources possessed by the partner are 
sought after by the investing firm (Das and Teng, 2000). Additionally, strategic 
alliances are also more flexible than M&As. Withdrawing from a strategic alliance or 
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joint venture is not as complicated and costly as it might be to divest a prior 
acquisition. This makes strategic alliances a more viable alternative to M&As in 
order to cope with the uncertainty of R&D in earlier stages of the new business 
development process, when the technology and its potential rewards are not yet fully 
known.  
 There are a number of reasons why it can be argued that strategic alliances 
spur innovation. In particular, strategic alliances provide the ability to share costs and 
risks, to integrate complementary knowledge, and to aim at specific pieces of 
knowledge (De Man and Duysters, 2005). Their review of prior empirical studies 
shows a strong, positive effect for strategic alliances on innovative performance (De 
Man and Duysters, 2005). In addition, Stuart (2000) finds a positive effect between 
strategic alliances with large and innovative partners and innovation improvement 
and growth rates, and Baum et al. (2000) find that the number of alliances positively 
affects the success of biotech start-ups.  
 
Corporate venture capital investments 
A strategy that has received growing attention more recently among researchers and 
practitioners alike is the use of corporate venture capital. Corporate venture capital 
(CVC) emerged in the 1960s and can be defined as “equity investment by incumbent 
firms in independent entrepreneurial ventures, i.e., relatively new, not-publicly-traded 
companies that are seeking capital to continue operation” (Gompers and Lerner, 
1998). Although this definition is broad and may include many types of inter-
organizational ties, it should be noted that there are three aspects that distinguish a 
CVC investment from a strategic alliance. First of all, the notion of CVC investments 
focuses specifically on venture capital investments. Venture capital investments are 
usually high-risk investments in high-tech start-ups. They are typically structured 
through a dedicated venture capital fund, in a number of rounds, and with a number 
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of co-investors. Second, managers consider CVC investments and alliances as 
distinct activities that have to be managed in different ways: corporations set up a 
separate, dedicated organizational entity with allocated funds to invest in interesting 
ventures (Chesbrough, 2002, 2003; Dushnitsky, 2004). Strategic alliances on the 
other hand, are often governed by an alliance management department at the 
corporate level, but also in many cases managed at the divisional or business unit 
level (Dyer et al., 2001; Lavie, 2004; Heimeriks et al., 2007). Third, strategic 
alliances imply that the otherwise independent partners become mutually dependent 
through their resource commitments in joint R&D. In a technology alliance, partners 
strive toward shared objectives and try to maximize the financial return from their 
collaboration. In contrast, in CVC investments, the investing company has different 
objectives than the management team of the portfolio firm: the investor invests 
unilaterally in the portfolio firm and claims in return several rights.  
 Prior research has indicated that the motives for companies to invest in 
entrepreneurial start-ups range from purely financial objectives (i.e. return on 
investment) to more strategic motivations, such as identifying possible acquisition 
targets and obtaining a window on new technologies (Ernst et al., 2005; Keil, 2003; 
Siegel et al., 1988; Sykes, 1990). As shown in a study by Kortum and Lerner (2000), 
venture capital activity has significant, positive impact on the patenting rates of 
industries, stressing the role of venture capital to spur innovation in general. From an 
investing firm’s perspective, CVC investments are particularly interesting to 
contribute to the firm’s innovation output, because they enable them to get access to 
technologies in an early stage of development, when it is still too risky to establish 
equity alliances such as joint ventures. CVC investments can also serve as a window 
on emerging technologies. In that case, it is not even appropriate to establish strategic 
alliances until it becomes clear that the technology of the portfolio firm might have 
some commercial potential for the corporate investor. 
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 Because CVC investments are specifically targeted at young, privately held 
companies (Gompers and Lerner, 1998), they provide the investing firm with access 
to a source of knowledge that might be difficult to target through M&As or strategic 
alliances. Moreover, these new ventures are an important source of innovative ideas 
that still need to be further developed or commercialized. Therefore, getting access to 
these ideas and technologies in this stage provides the investing firm with a possible 
vital source of competitive advantage. After all, breakthrough inventions often come 
from new, pioneering technologies (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). Additionally, it 
should be noted that CVC investments are a flexible instrument to invest in new 
technologies with unknown future potential. This allows companies to invest in 
different, even competing technologies, with potentially high but also highly 
uncertain returns. CVC investments allow the investing company to defer irreversible 
investments until new information about the economic viability of a technology 
becomes available. Using less flexible modes of technology sourcing such as equity 
alliances and acquisitions in this phase might lead to long-term commitments to 
technologies that in the end prove not to be viable. CVC investments allow firms to 
“explore” a broad range of promising technologies while not over-committing 
themselves to specific technological trajectories. 
 A number of prior studies have examined the effect of corporate venture 
capital investments on the performance of the investing company. Dushnitsky and 
Lenox (2005) found a positive relationship between CVC investments and future 
patent citation levels, whereas Wadhwa and Kotha (2006) found an inverted U-
shaped relationship between CVC investments and the subsequent patent applications 
rate of investing firms. In addition, Gompers (2002) finds that the success rate of 
CVC investments within the same industry is larger than the success rate of non-
related CVC investments, which is partially supported by the findings of Keil et al. 
(2008). In a study on the effects of intra-industry, related and unrelated CVC 
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investments, they found a significant, positive effect for related CVC investments 
only. In addition, Dushnitsky and Lenox (2006) showed that CVC investments that 
focus specifically on strategic outcomes provide greater firm value than financially 
focused CVC investments.  
 To summarize, CVC investments are targeted at young, entrepreneurial 
ventures that are generally regarded as an important source of innovative ideas. 
Getting access to these emerging technologies provides the investing firm with a 
viable source of competitive advantage, leading to increased innovation performance. 
However, as noted earlier, most established, innovative firms do not limit their 
sourcing strategies to one mode in particular. Rather, they invest in a portfolio of 
technology-sourcing partnerships. Therefore, it is not sufficient to study the effects of 
CVC investments in isolation, as the innovation output of the investing firms might 
also be the result of other external knowledge-sourcing partnerships. Hence, by 
neglecting the impact of other sourcing modes, the effect of CVC investments is 
likely to be estimated incorrectly as a result of an omitted variable bias. 
Consequently, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1. The positive effect of CVC investments when studied in isolation 
is overestimated due to an omitted variable bias 
 
In order to estimate the true benefits of CVC investments on innovative performance, 
they should therefore be studied in relation to the other strategies for external 
technology sourcing that are used simultaneously.  
 
Additivity of CVC investments 
Prior studies on the relationship between external technology sourcing and innovation 
have found ample evidence that external sourcing of knowledge positively affects 
innovation output of investing firms. However, this evidence might be biased to some 
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extent, as the innovative performance of firms may not necessarily be the result of 
investing in one particular technology-sourcing mode, but rather the combined effect 
of multiple types of external technology sourcing modes. In order to overcome this 
potential omitted variable bias, it is important to look at the investment portfolio of 
firms. One of the ways to do so is by estimating the additivity of different technology 
sourcing modes. By additivity we mean that the combined effect of two or more 
activities is equal to the sum of the effects of each of these activities separately. For 
two strategies, this can be represented by the following function: f(x,y) = f(x) + f(y). 
When applying this to the notion of external technology sourcing, we suggest that the 
total innovative performance of firms is a linear function of the different technology 
sourcing modes a firm undertakes.  
 After all, CVC investments, strategic alliances and M&As serve the same 
overall purpose: getting access to external knowledge to strengthen a firm’s 
technological capabilities and performance. However, despite this commonality, they 
all have different characteristics as mentioned before and consequently they can be 
used to target different types of knowledge or knowledge in different stages of 
development. We argue that the simultaneous use of different external sourcing 
modes helps firms improve their innovation performance. The additivity of different 
external sourcing modes is in line with the open innovation imperative (Chesbrough, 
2003): innovating firms can improve their innovativeness when they tap into different 
types of external knowledge along the innovation funnel. Innovating firms should not 
only collaborate with universities and research labs on new scientific discoveries that 
still have to go a long way before they hit the market, but they should also get 
involved in CVC, co-development with partners, spin-ins and technology 
acquisitions. On the one hand, companies have to source external technologies to 
strengthen their current businesses but on the other hand, they also need to generate 
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completely new businesses. Firms can thus benefit from sourcing concurrently 
different types of knowledge.  
Innovating firms thus have to get involved in different sourcing modes at the 
same time as each sourcing mode will allow the company to source a particular type 
of knowledge. For instance, due to the irreversible nature of M&As, they are less 
attractive in the early phases of development, when the potential value of the 
technology is still highly uncertain. Strategic alliances are more flexible, and they are 
also valuable for sharing of costs and risks, which makes them more suitable for co-
developing new technologies. In this sense, strategic alliances and M&As can serve 
as an additional way to source new technologies within the context of new business 
development. In turn, CVC investments are especially valuable to target knowledge 
that is in an early stage of development and which is often privately held. Because 
these kinds of technologies might be more difficult to target through an acquisition or 
through the use of strategic alliances, CVC investments can play an important role 
here. Moreover, even when a strategic alliance or M&A is a viable sourcing mode, 
they may be less attractive because they do not have the desired level of flexibility.  
Several scholars (Van de Vrande et al., 2006, 2009; Tong and Li, 2007) have 
argued that in the face of high technological and commercial uncertainty firms are 
likely to delay their investments in certain technologies. In this case they make small 
investments in a certain technological field in order to build familiarity with this new 
field. A recent survey (McMillan et al., 2008) has shown that CVC investments are 
typically made in earlier stage technologies or in technologies that are non-core to the 
company. Given the fact that different technology sourcing modes are effective in 
targeting different technologies or innovation stages, one can expect that firms will 
benefit from establishing different types of sourcing modes resulting in a diversified 
portfolio of channels to tap into external technology. Furthermore, not only 
technological uncertainty is important in this context but also endogenous uncertainty 
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arising from the dissimilarities among partners plays a role in technology sourcing 
mode choice (Van de Vrande et al., 2009). In the case of a small overlap in the 
technology bases, the partners are likely to opt for CVC investments over strategic 
alliances and M&As. On the other hand, in the case of lower information asymmetry 
firms are more likely to choose acquisitions over strategic alliances and CVC 
investments. Hence, different technology sourcing modes play a different role in the 
external sourcing of technology, depending on aspects such as the stage of 
development of the technology and the level of uncertainty surrounding the 
investment decision. Being involved in different types of technology sourcing modes 
is therefore an important way for innovating companies to get access to different 
types of knowledge in different stages of development. In the long run, being 
involved in different strategies that cover the various stages in the technology 
development funnel enhances the variety of technologies that is invested in, thereby 
increasing the innovative performance of the firm (Powell et al., 1999; Baum et al., 
2000).    
 Consequently, engaging in different types of external technology sourcing 
modes is an important way for firms to improve their innovative performance. 
Companies will optimally profit from external sources of technology when they can 
tap into external technology at the right stage of their development. Depending on a 
firm’s innovation strategy and the type of external knowledge, it might choose to be 
involved early on in a technology development or it might wait until the technology 
is further developed and has proven to be a commercially valuable technology. 
Hence, firms need different types of external technology sourcing modes to 
assimilate knowledge in different stages of development. Investing in CVC 
investments, next to strategic alliances and M&As, will therefore increase the 
innovative output of investing firms. Thus, we hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 2. Corporate venture capital investments are additive to other 
modes of external technology sourcing. 
 
Complementarity of CVC investments 
Besides the additivity of different technology sourcing modes, another interesting 
aspect is whether different technology sourcing modes are complementary to each 
other. The notion of complementarity is closely related to the concept of 
superadditivity or supermodularity (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Supermodularity 
occurs when ‘adding an activity while already performing the other activity has a 
higher incremental effect on performance than when doing the activity in isolation’ 
(Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). Mathematically, this can be represented as: f(x,y)≥ 
f(x) + f(y). The two activities x and y can then be regarded as complements. In 
practice, the forces of both additivity and complementarity can both work at the same 
time. Additivity indicates that innovating companies benefit when they deal 
simultaneously with technologies that are in different stages of development (see 
Hypothesis 2), whereas complementarity arises from reputational effects, and 
knowledge- and experience spillovers between the different sourcing modes.  
 With respect to different technology sourcing modes used for external 
technology sourcing, complementarity means that there is a symbiotic relationship 
between the different technology sourcing modes and that their joint effects on a 
firms’ innovation performance is stronger than their sole effects. Actually, the notion 
of complementarity suggests that each technology sourcing mode not only has a 
direct effect on the innovative output, but that each technology sourcing mode also 
positively affects the relationship between other technology sourcing modes and the 
innovative performance of firms. The complementarity between CVC investments 
and other technology sourcing modes can result from different drivers. We first focus 
on knowledge spillovers as well as experience spillovers. First, CVC investments 
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enable learning about new technological knowledge, which increases the absorptive 
capacity of firms. By making small investments in entrepreneurial start-ups, investing 
firms gradually expand their technological knowledge base and, consequently also 
expand their absorptive capacity. This increased absorptive capacity improves the 
extent to which the firm is able to recognize, assimilate and exploit the technological 
knowledge obtained through the use of other technology sourcing mechanisms. A 
broad portfolio of technology sourcing modes can allow firms to draw knowledge 
from multiple external sources, thereby providing them with information advantages 
and knowledge spillover effects. Ties to a large number of different sources might 
provide firms with the opportunity to better assess the specific value of the 
knowledge gained from a particular technology-sourcing mode. This process of 
triangulation (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005) is seen as an important aspect of 
assessing information with a high novelty value. As a result, we can expect that the 
required knowledge to source external technology effectively through strategic 
alliances, for instance, is leveraged by the existing CVC investments and vice versa.  
In addition, recent work (Anand and Khanna, 2000; De Celis and Lipinsky, 
2007; Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007; Sampson, 2005) has shown that prior 
engagement in strategic alliances can lead to future success because experience helps 
firms to gain knowledge about critical processes and issues in dealing with alliances. 
Similar reasoning applies to CVC investments and M&As. Through experience, firms 
accumulate a collective understanding of the execution of organizational tasks 
involved with external sourcing of knowledge, which in turn leads to more refined 
and efficient processes over time (Zollo et al., 2002). As a result, there are learning 
effects from external knowledge sourcing that enable firms to be more efficient in 
using external acquisition modes (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). Similarly, making 
small, learning investments made through CVC investments may also lead to 
experience spillovers (Zollo and Reuer, 2001). This implies that by experimenting 
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with CVC investments, the investing firm creates management skills in the 
recognition, absorption and assimilation of external knowledge, which can also be 
applied to other governance modes in the technology-sourcing portfolio. Overall, this 
increased external sourcing experience would be beneficial to the whole sourcing 
portfolio, as it also enhances the effectiveness and efficiency with which knowledge 
is being targeted and transferred through other governance modes.  
The complementarity of different sourcing modes should however not be 
limited to knowledge and experience spillovers. Different external sourcing modes 
also provide access to complementary resources (Dushnitsky and Lavie, 2008). Arora 
and Gambardella (1990) argued that one type of external resource frequently 
increases the need for other types. For example: car manufacturers who invest in 
technology savvy start-ups to come up with new hybrid cars will also have to 
establish technology alliances with battery manufacturers. As complementarity of 
external resources is associated with each type of external sourcing modes, we can 
expect that higher technological performance will result from the combination of 
different external technology sourcing modes. In addition, having more alliances, 
acquisitions and CVC investments provide also greater visibility and prominence to 
the innovating firms. When a company invests in several CVC investments and has 
the reputation to be a reliable and trustworthy investor, it will have an advantage in 
establishing new technology alliances or to negotiate an acquisition of high-tech 
start-ups. But also the opposite is true: a firm may leverage its alliance network and 
track record of high-tech acquisitions to enhance visibility among the VC community 
in order to legitimize new CVC investments. Consequently, firms that rely on 
visibility and reputational effects will establish new external sourcing activities more 
effectively and with more interesting partners, leading to a stronger innovative 
performance compared to their competitors that cannot benefit from strong visibility. 
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Based on these different arguments we argue that CVC investments enhance 
the relationship between strategic alliances or M&As and innovative performance. In 
other words, CVC investments are expected to be complementary to other modes of 
external technology sourcing. 
Hypothesis 3. Corporate venture capital investments are complementary to 
other modes of external technology sourcing. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample 
To test our hypotheses, we use a sample of firms that were active in the 
pharmaceutical industry between 1990 and 2000. The dataset was constructed in the 
following way. For each year of the observation period, the 200 largest innovative 
companies in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry were selected. 
Following Rothaermel and Hess (2007) and Rothaermel and Thursby (2007), 
companies active in pharmaceutics and biotechnology are those that are active in the 
following patent classes, defined by the USPTO: 424, 435, 436, 514, 530, 536, 800, 
and 9301. Large innovating firms are more likely to engage in external technology 
sourcing activities and are more likely to report them publicly (Keil et al., 2008). 
Prior research on alliances and acquisitions has for that reason also focused on the 
largest companies in the industry (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati, 1995; Hitt et al., 1991; Keil et 
al., 2008). After selecting the companies with the largest cumulative number of 
patents in the relevant patent classes, research institutes and universities were 
removed from the sample. Next, the remaining sample was manually checked for 
parents and affiliates using Dun & Bradstreet's Who Owns Whom, which were then 
                                                 
1
  Description of the patent classes is as follows: 424: drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions; 435: chemistry: 
molecular biology and microbiology; 436: chemistry: analytical and immunological testing; 514: drug, bio-affecting and 
body treating compositions; 530: chemistry: natural resins or derivatives; peptides or proteins; lignins or reaction products 
thereof; 536: organic compounds; 800: multicellular living organisms and unmodified parts thereof and related processes; 
930: peptide or protein sequence. 
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aggregated on parent company level. We will refer to these independent companies 
as "focal firms", to distinguish them from their partners.  
 Next, we have gathered information on all the venture capital investments, 
technology alliances, minority holdings, joint ventures, and merger and acquisitions 
of these firms during the period 1985-19962, as well as patent data and financial 
information. Corporate venture capital data was derived from the Thomson 
VentureXpert database, data concerning alliances and joint ventures was obtained 
from the MERIT-CATI databank on Cooperative Agreements and Technology 
Indicators (Hagedoorn, 1993), and we used Thomson ONE Banker to collect 
information regarding the companies' M&A activity. Because both the collected 
alliances and corporate venture capital investments have a strong technology 
component, we included only technology related M&As in our sample, following the 
method by Ahuja and Katila (2001). The final sample comprises 4,302 technology-
sourcing deals. 
 Patent information until 2003 was collected for all firms included in our 
sample using data from the US Patent and Trademark Office. Because the US Patent 
and Trademark Office grants patents both on subsidiary as well as on parent company 
level (Patel and Pavitt, 1997), and the organizational level on which patents are 
applied for differs between companies, we consolidated the patents on parent 
company level for each observation year, using Who Owns Whom by Dun & 
Bradstreet. In addition to that, we gathered financial data using Worldscope, 
including sales, and research and development expenses.  
 
Variables 
                                                 
2
  Longer time lags are used because of the use of patent citations (a patent can only be cited after it has been issued which 
takes on average 3 years for the firms in our sample). In order to avoid right censoring of the data, we take 1997 as the last 
observation year for the dependent variable. 
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Dependent variable. Our dependent variable, innovative performance, measures the 
innovation output of the focal firms. Patent counts have often been criticized as an 
indicator for innovative performance because this measure gives an identical weight 
to each patent application, and hence does not capture the importance of the 
innovation (Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003; Trajtenberg, 1990). In order to capture the 
value of innovation, we therefore use patent citations, or weighted patent counts 
(Trajtenberg, 1990). Weighted patent counts (WPC) is also a count variable, but each 
patent i is now weighed according to the subsequent citations Ci it receives, assuming 
that more important patents receive more citations and vice versa. Weighted patent 
counts for n patents applied for in year t can be calculated following the formula 
below (Trajtenberg, 1990): 
1
(1 )
tn
t i
i
WPC C
=
= +∑  
Patent citations were collected until 2003 and in order to avoid right-censoring 
problems, we took 1997 as the last year of the observation period. As the time 
horizon of the dataset is limited and we are not able to observe all possible forward 
citations for each patent, we use the simulated cumulative distribution lags developed 
by Hall et al. (2001) to estimate the total number of citations each patent is likely to 
receive. The simulated cumulative distribution lags show the yearly distributions of 
the total citations a patent is likely to receive. Using these distribution lags, we are 
able to estimate the total number of citations a patent will receive, based on the 
cumulative number of citations till 2003, the last year of our observation period. 
 In addition, we studied the additive effects of CVC investments on 
exploratory innovation, including novel, emerging, and pioneering technologies 
(Ahuja and Lampert, 2001) as independent variables. Novel technologies is measured 
the number of new technology classes that are entered in the year of observation. 
Emerging technologies is calculated as the number of patents that cite technologies 
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that are on average less than 2 years old. Finally, pioneering technologies is 
calculated as the number of patents that cite no other patents. 
 
Independent variables. Hypothesis 1 predicts a direct relationship between CVC 
investments and innovative output. Therefore, for every observation in year t we 
counted the number of CVC investments in the five years prior to the observation 
year (t-1 to t-5). This moving window approach is considered to be an appropriate 
timeframe during which the existing portfolio of external technology activities is 
likely to have an influence on the current technological performance of a firm (Katila 
and Ahuja, 2002; Gulati, 1995; Stuart, 2000). This line of reasoning has been 
confirmed by a robustness check in which we also computed the independent 
variables using a 4-year window. The 4-years and 5-years lagged variables were 
highly correlated (r > .95 in all cases) and the estimation results using the 4-years 
lagged variables were very similar to the results presented in this paper.  
 Next, we are interested in the additivity and complementarity of CVC 
investments vis-à-vis the other modes for technology sourcing such as strategic 
alliances and M&A activities. Accordingly, we have calculated the number of non-
equity alliances, equity alliances, and M&As as additional variables. Equity alliances 
are strategic technology partnerships that involve the use of equity investments, such 
as joint ventures and minority holdings (less than 50% ownership). For every 
observation year t, we counted the number of times each technology-sourcing mode 
was established in the five years prior to the observation year (t-1 to t-5).  
  
Control variables. We included technological capital or patent stock as a measure of 
a firm's technological strength (e.g. Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005; Katila and Ahuja, 
2002; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002). This variable is computed as the cumulative 
number of patents applied for by the focal firm in the five years prior to the 
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observation year t. A moving window of 5 years is the appropriate time frame for 
assessing technological impact (Podolny and Stuart, 1995; Stuart and Podolny, 1996; 
Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Ahuja, 2000). Studies about R&D depreciation 
(Griliches, 1979, 1984) suggest that knowledge capital depreciates sharply, losing 
most of its economic value within 5 years.   
 R&D expenditures can be seen as a means to generate absorptive capacity 
necessary to benefit from external technology sourcing. We therefore include R&D 
intensity (R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales) as a control variable. In 
addition to that, we controlled for size (natural logarithm of sales) and we introduced 
yearly dummy variables to capture eventual changes in patent application levels, 
legal system or economic environment. The control variables size and R&D intensity 
are lagged by one year.  
 
Method 
The dependent variable of this study, weighted patent counts, is a count variable. 
Although Poisson models are often used to estimate count outcomes, the model in 
practice rarely fits due to overdispersion (Long and Freese, 2003). Because our data 
shows significant evidence of overdispersion (i.e. the variance largely exceeds the 
mean – see Table 1), a negative binomial regression model seems to be more 
appropriate (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). Hausman et al., 1984; Stuart, 2000). The 
negative binomial model for panel data is estimated using the XTNBREG command in 
STATA. 
 We furthermore employed a Hausman specification test (1978) on the 
baseline model to determine the choice between a random- and a fixed-effects model. 
The Hausman test was strongly significant, indicating that a fixed-effects model is 
the appropriate model for this analysis. Because fixed effects models do not allow the 
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inclusion of time-invariant variables, region dummies were not included in the 
analysis3.  
 In addition, given the exploratory nature of CVC investments, we have 
carried out some additional analyses, using exploratory innovation measures as 
dependent variables. Different models were estimated, using pioneering, emerging 
and novel technologies as dependent variables. To enhance interpretability, we have 
used a negative binomial model with fixed effects for these analyses as well. 
 
RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics and correlations between the independent variables are 
presented in Table 1. As shown in Table 1, there are high correlations among the 
control variables representing the various forms of external technology sourcing 
(non-equity alliances, equity alliances, and M&As). These high correlations are a first 
indicator for the existence of complementarity (e.g. Arora and Gambardella, 1990; 
Laursen and Mahnke, 2001; Geraghty, 2007) and they are in line with earlier findings 
by Arora and Gambardella (1990) and Cassiman and Veugelers (2006). However, a 
positive correlation among different strategies is not a necessary, nor a sufficient 
condition to assume complementarity (Arora, 1996; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006).  
These positive correlations also stress the importance of estimating the effects 
of CVC investments while including other external sourcing modes in the analysis. 
Since external technology sourcing strategies are highly correlated, the positive 
effects of CVC investments found in earlier studies might be the effect of other, 
unobserved factors rather than stemming directly from CVC investments.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1, Table 2a, and Table 2b here 
                                                 
3
 We have also performed a random-effects analysis including industry and region dummies and found very similar results, 
underscoring the robustness of the models presented in this paper. 
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Table 2a presents the results of the negative binomial regressions, using 
weighted patent counts as a dependent variable. Table 2b shows the results for the 
creation of pioneering, emerging and novel technologies respectively. The first 
models present the baseline model, including only the control variables size, R&D 
intensity and technological capital. Model 2 in Table 2a, and Models 2, 6, and 10 in 
Table 2b present the effect of CVC investments on innovation outcomes, without 
controlling for other modes of external technology sourcing, followed by a model 
including the squared term to test for a possible curvilinear relationship between 
CVC investments and performance. Finally, in Model 4 in Table 2a, and Models 4, 8, 
and 12 in Table 2b, we include the other technology sourcing modes, i.e. non-equity 
alliances, equity alliances, and M&As in the analysis. These variables represent the 
stock of other external sourcing activities undertaken by the investing firm in the 5 
years prior to the year of observation4.  
 Hypothesis 1 predicted an overestimation of the positive effects of CVC 
investments and subsequent innovation output, as a result of omitted variable bias. 
Models 2 and 3 in Table 2a show that prior CVC investments have a positive, but 
curvilinear effect on weighted patent counts, which is in line with prior studies 
(Wadhwa and Kotha, 2006). The results furthermore indicate the possibility of an 
omitted variable bias when CVC investments are studied in isolation, as the 
magnitude of the direct effect of CVC investments on innovative performance 
decreases substantially when controlling for other modes of external technology 
sourcing (compare Model 3 to Model 4 in Table 2a). Moreover, the LR test statistics 
                                                 
4  Although the high correlations among the different sourcing strategies stress our belief that most diversified firms are 
involved in a large number of external technology sourcing agreements at the same time, they also indicate possible 
multicollinearity problems. However, the results in Model 3 indicate that, despite the high correlation among the 
independent variables (Table 1), t-statistics remain significant indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem here. As a 
robustness check, we have performed several additional analyses where a) the independent variables were included one by 
one, and b) where all governance modes were grouped into one stock variable. The results of these additional analyses are 
very similar to the results presented here; indicating that multicollinearity between the independent variables is not an issue 
in this paper.  
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indicate that the model including the other modes for external technology sourcing 
has a significantly better fit than the model with only CVC investments included. 
These findings are corroborated by the results in Table 2b. In particular, compare 
Models 2 and 4, and Models 11 and 12 from Table 2b, which show that the positive 
effects of CVC investments on pioneering and emerging technologies respectively 
become smaller (and the significance slightly weaker) when the other sourcing modes 
are included. Together, these findings provide empirical support for Hypothesis 1.  
Next, Hypothesis 2 states that CVC investments are additive to other modes 
of technology sourcing. The results in Tables 2a and 2b provide support for the 
additivity hypothesis (Hypothesis 2). Model 4 in Table 2 shows that non-equity 
alliances, equity alliance, M&As and CVC investments are all significant and 
positively related to innovation output. The results in Table 2b provide varying 
results. Models 2 and 3 show that CVC investments have a positive effect on the 
creation of pioneering technologies. However, the coefficient becomes insignificant 
when the other modes for external technology sourcing are included. Models 6, 7, 
and 8 show no significant effect for the use of CVC investments and the creation of 
novel technologies. This implies that CVC investments do not affect the generation 
of technologies that are new to the firm. Finally, Models 11 indicates that CVC 
investments are curvilinearly (inverted U-shaped) related to emerging technologies. 
Moreover, this effect holds when other modes for external knowledge sourcing are 
included (Model 12), indicating that CVC investments are indeed additive to other 
modes of technology sourcing when investing in emerging (or new) technologies. We 
will elaborate on those findings in the discussion section. 
 
Complementarity 
Next, we analyze to what extent the different modes for external technology sourcing 
are complementary (Hypothesis 3). In order to estimate complementarity, there are 
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two methods that can be found in the literature. First, there is the use of a production 
function approach to determine the effects of using particular combinations of 
external technology sourcing strategies on a firm’s innovative performance 
(Belderbos et al., 2006; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Mohnen and Röller, 2005). 
Using this approach allows for a direct test of the complementarity constraints, by 
testing multiple inequality constraints simultaneously (Mohnen and Röller, 2005). 
First, for each possible combination of strategies, a corresponding dummy variable is 
included to capture whether or not the firm is involved in that particular combination 
of strategies. These dummy variables are then included in a regression analysis and 
based on the estimates following from the regression analysis, a number of inequality 
restrictions can be tested. A more detailed explanation of this method can be found in 
Mohnen and Röller (2005).  
 Another method that can be found in the literature is the use of pair-wise 
interaction terms to assess complementarity (Bresnahan et al., 2002; Caroli and Van 
Reenen, 2001; Ichionowski et al., 1997; Lokshin et al., 2007). Using interaction terms 
allows for the estimation of the amount of interaction between two or more practices, 
whereas using a production function with dummies only provides an insight in 
particular combinations but remains silent on the magnitude of the increasing gains of 
using the one while already performing the other. However, pair-wise interaction 
terms assume that complementarity exists on the level of pairs of variables, and does 
not pick up the effects of multilateral interactions (Whittington et al., 1990). In 
addition, as pair-wise interactions are also used to estimate the ‘fit’ between two 
variables or the ‘moderating’ effect of one variable on the performance relationship 
of another variable, it remains unclear whether the significance of the interaction 
term reflects complementarity rather than ‘fit’ or ‘moderating’ effects (Tanriverdi & 
Venkatraman, 2005). 
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 Because the focus of this paper is on the complementarity of CVC 
investments vis-à-vis other strategies in the external technology-sourcing portfolio, 
we use a production function with dummies, rather than pair-wise interaction terms, 
to estimate complementarity. Following prior studies, we have defined dummy 
variables indicating the activity of the firms in our sample with regards to possible 
combinations of strategies. Table 3 provides an overview of the possible 
combinations and the number of firm-year observations indicating involvement in 
that particular set of external sourcing modes, using a five-year moving window. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 here 
-------------------------- 
Table 3 shows that the majority of firms is involved in a combination of non-equity 
alliances, equity alliances, and M&As. Combining these three strategies with CVC 
investment appears to be a common strategy as well, as is indicated by 98 firm-year 
observations depicting this portfolio. Assuming that firms optimize their portfolio, 
these figures give some indication concerning additivity and complementarity as 
apparently firms who invest in CVC investments are most likely to do so while 
simultaneously investing in other modes of technology sourcing. We also find pair-
wise combinations between non-equity and equity alliances and between these two 
external sources of technology and acquisitions. Pair-wise combinations with CVC 
investments as well as triads including CVC investments seem to be less popular 
among the firms in the database.  
 Next, these dummy variables are included in a negative binomial regression 
model in order to estimate the effect of particular combinations of strategies on the 
innovation performance of firms. The results are shown in Table 4. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 here 
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-------------------------- 
The results of the regression analysis presented in Model 1 in Table 4 indicate that 
combining non-equity alliances with equity alliances or M&As positively affect the 
innovation output of firms. Moreover, the results suggest that combining non-equity 
alliances with equity alliances and M&As, and a strategy combining the four external 
technology-sourcing modes also positively affect innovative performance. The results 
in Models 1 and 2 also indicate that using only CVC investments as a way to get 
access to external technology does not affect the innovative performance of firms. 
One-sided Wald tests furthermore show that the coefficient of using a combination of 
non-equity alliances, equity alliances, M&As and CVC investments is greater than 
the coefficient for using a combination of non-equity alliances, equity alliances, and 
M&As but no CVC investments. This indicates that CVC investments are additive to 
non-equity alliances, equity alliances and M&As when used simultaneously, thereby 
providing additional support for Hypothesis 2. A portfolio consisting of CVC 
investments next to the more traditional modes for external technology sourcing has a 
positive effect on innovation performance.  
However, these results do not yet indicate the existence of complementarity 
between the different external sourcing modes. In order to test for complementarity 
using the results from a production function model, a set of multiple inequality 
restrictions needs to be tested simultaneously (for an overview and explanation see 
Mohnen and Röller (2005) and Belderbos et al. (2006)). In order to conduct the 
complementarity tests, one needs to have coefficient estimates of all possible 
strategies. Unfortunately, our dataset does not include observations for firms who 
have invested solely in CVC and equity alliances, or CVC, equity alliances, and 
M&As (see Table 3). Moreover, there is only one observation for the combination 
M&A and CVC investments. Hence, we are not able to follow the direct test for 
complementarity as suggested by the authors mentioned above. Therefore, we have 
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also estimated a model using a single dummy variable for all other technology 
sourcing strategies (non-equity alliances, equity alliances, and/or M&As). The results 
of this analysis are presented in Model 2 of Table 4. Firms that only tap into external 
technology sources through CVC investments are not performing better than other 
companies – this contrasts with the positive impact of other technology sourcing 
modes. However, CVC investments in combination with other technology sourcing 
modes improve firms’ innovation performance significantly. With only two groups of 
external technology modes we need to test only one inequality constraint: 
(1,1)+(0,0)-(1,0)-(0,1)>=0. We have tested this inequality constraint using a Wald 
test. The result of this test shows that this inequality constraint holds and thus 
indicates that CVC investments are complements to other governance modes5. This 
result confirms Hypothesis 3. CVC investments are not only additive to other modes 
for external technology sourcing; they can also be regarded as complementary. The 
implications of these findings will be discussed in the next section. 
 
DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we have examined how different modes for external technology 
sourcing affect the innovative performance of investing firms. Focusing on CVC 
investments, which are a relatively new vehicle for technology sourcing, we have 
estimated the direct effect of CVC investments on innovation output followed by an 
investigation of the effects when CVC investments are combined with the more 
traditional ways of technology sourcing, such as non-equity alliances, equity alliances 
and M&As. We have argued that CVC investments are both additive as well as 
complementary to other technology sourcing modes. They are additive because they 
all target different types of knowledge and are complementary too because of the 
                                                 
5
  We first test the null hypothesis H0: (1,1)+(0,0)-(1,0)-(0,1)=0. This hypothesis is rejected (Chi2(1)=2.65*). Next, we test if 
(1,1)+(0,0)-(1,0)-(0,1)>=0 which is confirmed (p=0.95). 
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specific knowledge and experience spillovers associated with external knowledge 
acquisition. 
 The results confirm the findings of prior studies that CVC investments have 
an inverted U-shaped effect on subsequent innovative performance (e.g. Wadhwa and 
Kotha, 2006). In addition, the results of this study indicate that including other 
strategies for technological search provides a richer explanation of the role of 
different modes for external technology sourcing and, as a result, that the effects of 
CVC investments should not be studied in isolation. The results presented in Models 
3 and 4 in Table 2a indicate the existence of a potential omitted variable bias and 
stress the importance of including the whole portfolio of technology sourcing modes 
that a company has at its disposal. 
 The results in this study furthermore show the role of CVC investments in 
improving innovation performance when they are used jointly with other technology 
sourcing modes for external knowledge acquisition. The results not only indicate that 
CVC investments are additive to other modes for technology sourcing, they also 
support the complementarity hypothesis when CVC investments are combined with 
other technology sourcing modes. Combining CVC investments with non-equity 
alliances, equity alliances and M&As positively affects the innovation rates of the 
investing firm. This supports our call for a portfolio approach to external technology 
acquisition research in general and CVC investment research in particular. More 
specifically, firms that have a diversified external sourcing portfolio are likely to 
benefit from their investments in different external knowledge sourcing modes. 
 Finally, the results of this study indicate that CVC investments are 
particularly interesting when a firm seeks to invest in the creation of new, emerging 
technologies. The results in Table 2b show no relationship between CVC investments 
and the creation of novel technologies, indicating that CVC investments are not well 
suited to explore into new technological domains. This is in line with Keil et al. 
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(2008) who showed that the benefits from investing in CVC are greatest when 
investments are made in related industries. Furthermore, CVC investments are found 
to be more impactful when firms seek to operate on the forefront of technological 
development. Some prior research has shown the benefits of CVC investment for 
exploratory inter-firm learning (Schildt et al., 2005), this implies that CVC 
investments are an important vehicle to enable the investing firm to operate on the 
technological frontier by developing newly  emerging technologies.  
 This study contributes to the existing body of research in a number of ways. 
First, we combined the different modes of technology cooperation a company can use 
to get access to external knowledge in one single model (including CVC investments, 
non-equity alliances, equity alliances and M&As). Although prior research has 
extensively investigated the performance effects of CVC investments, strategic 
alliances and M&As separately, studies combining different modes are relatively 
scarce (exceptions are Keil et al., 2008; Nicholls-Nixon and Woo, 2003). Since most 
large firms are engaged in different technology partnerships at the same time, 
including all those possible technology-sourcing strategies in one model provides a 
richer description of the dynamics when firms pursue a more open way of innovation. 
By doing so, this paper also contributes to the increasing body of research on 
portfolio diversity (e.g. McGill and Santoro, 2009; Jiang et al., 2010). 
Additionally, this paper sheds more light on the role of CVC investments, by 
stressing the unique benefits of CVC investments for the overall innovation 
performance of firms, as well as for the creation of exploratory innovation. 
Moreover, the results show how CVC investments can increase innovation 
performance when used in combination with the other modes of technology 
partnering, especially when used simultaneously with technology sourcing modes 
that target a more mature type of technology as opposed to the relatively new 
technologies that are aimed at through the use of CVC investments.  
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Implications and future research 
The findings of this study have important implications for management. First they 
show that CVC investments can have a positive effect on a firm’s subsequent 
innovative performance. Moreover, the results indicate the importance of CVC 
investments for exploratory innovation. Investing in CVC, next to the traditional 
modes of technology sourcing, can help or even make a difference for the subsequent 
creation of pioneering and emerging technologies. This implies that managers should 
carefully consider the motives behind investing in CVC, and the type of exploration 
that is sought. 
Moreover, our findings suggest that CVC investments are highly 
complementary to other technology sourcing modes and should thus be used in 
conjunction with these modes rather than as a stand-alone investment strategy. In line 
with the imperative of open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003), the current study stresses 
the advantages of the simultaneous use of different external sourcing modes at a 
particular point in time. Firms can improve their innovation performance by tapping 
simultaneously into different external technology sourcing mechanisms. In particular, 
the results of this study show that combining CVC investments with non-equity 
alliances, equity alliances and M&As positively affects the innovation rates of the 
investing firms. This implies that managers must carefully design their external 
sourcing portfolio. Particularly with an increasing interest nowadays for the use of 
CVC investments, managers need to be aware of the fact that CVC investments in 
early stage technologies are mostly beneficial when used as part of a broader 
technology-sourcing portfolio and in combination with alliances and acquisitions of 
technologies that have already been further developed into marketable innovations. 
As a consequence, firms should think about external technology sourcing as a 
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portfolio of investments, which requires a more centralized approach towards 
investment decisions.  
Of course this study is not without limitations. The first limitation regards the 
use of weighted patent counts to measure innovation output. Although patent 
indicators are widely used as a proxy for technological knowledge (e.g. Hagedoorn 
and Cloodt, 2003; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002), it should be noted that there is also a 
significant share of knowledge created within the firm that cannot be captured in 
patent information. Furthermore, improvements in technology do not necessarily lead 
to a better financial performance of a company. Technological knowledge is not the 
same as successful new product introductions that lead to a surge in sales. In future 
research more advanced combined measures of innovative performance, based on a 
combination of measures of new product introductions, patents, and licenses might 
further sophisticate our approach. 
Another aspect regarding measurement is that we have measured CVC 
investments by counting the number of investments. For M&As and alliances we take 
on a similar approach. However, investments might differ significantly in terms of 
size. Some CVC investments amount to several hundred thousand dollars while 
others might account for investments of millions. Also comparing CVC investments 
or alliances to large M&As that require investments of over 100 million dollar might 
create a potential bias in our results. Future research might enhance the value of our 
contribution by including the financial investments made in a particular mode.  
In addition, the current study does not take into account the availability of 
internal human capital, for instance in the form of star scientists (Rothaermel and 
Hess, 2007). Internal human capital may play an important role in the transfer and 
accumulation of external knowledge and hence in the innovation outcomes of 
external technology sourcing. Although the internal resources of firms are partially 
captured by their patents stocks and their R&D expenditures, adding a measure of 
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internal human capital may improve our understanding of how internal resources 
interact with external technology sourcing. 
This study focuses on three main modes of external knowledge acquisition: 
strategic alliances, M&As and CVC investments. Firms however also employ other 
forms of external knowledge acquisition of which the most important one is licensing 
(Tsai and Wang, 2007). As a result, it would be logical to include licensing deals as 
another external technology sourcing mode. However, there are two main reasons not 
to do so. First, there is a practical problem; licensing deals are not documented in 
large-scale databases in a way that is compatible with the other technology sourcing 
modes. Second, there is a more fundamental reason. CVC investments, technology 
alliances and acquisitions of small technology firms are instrumental in the 
development of new technologies in the focal company. Licensing agreements 
usually focus on the exchange of a ready-to-use technology. Hence, licensing is 
generally not geared towards the exploration of new technology, but rather focuses 
on the exploitation of existing technologies and will not allow the investing firm to 
build a competitive advantage based on its technological superiority. Similarly, arms-
length technological contracting and licensing deals may be more interesting to 
improve non-core technologies, rather than to upgrade core technologies 
(Chesbrough and Schwartz, 2007). Future research could extend the current study by 
indicating the different roles these external technology-sourcing modes play within 
an open innovation strategy. In this way, technology contracting and licensing could 
be integrated alongside alliances, acquisitions and CVC investments as different 
channels to source technology from the outside. 
Moreover, prior research in the field of open innovation has also indicated the 
importance of informal relationships, for instance through professional conferences, 
meetings, fairs, and exhibitions (Laursen and Salter, 2006). As these informal 
knowledge channels may also play an important role in the knowledge acquisition 
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process (next to the formal collaboration efforts), as full understanding of different 
external sourcing mechanisms would benefit from including both formal as well as 
informal sources of knowledge and relationships.  
Finally, in this paper we have studied the impact of CVC investments on the 
innovative performance of firms and the extent to which these types of investments 
are complementary to other modes of external technology sourcing. However, we do 
not take a truly dynamic perspective on external technology acquisition. Alternative 
to analyzing the impact of external technology sourcing at the firm level, one could 
focus on the innovation project level by tracing the sequencing of different external 
technology modes over time; CVC investments are often regarded as a first stage 
investment that might evolve in another type of mode when the technology further 
matures. CVC investments, strategic alliances and M&As are all part of a broader 
spectrum of technology insourcing that can be used sequentially when a technology 
becomes more mature. Future research into the dynamics of CVC investments as a 
first stage investment should be conducted in order to get the full picture of how 
CVC investments as an initial investment in new technology projects can add value 
for firms. For instance, applying a real options logic to the external sourcing of 
technologies (e.g. Kogut, 1991) might lead to the suggestion that strategic alliances 
or M&As after an initial CVC investment improves innovative performance.  
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
  Mean S.D. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Weighted patent counts 1597 2300       
2. Size 9.61 2.19            
3. R&D intensity 0.10 0.24 -.43          
4. Technological capital  0.61 0.82 .16 -.12        
5. Non-equity alliances 3.75 5.84 .00 -.07 .57      
6. Equity alliances 1.85 2.67 .02 -.09 .46 .74    
7. M&As 2.19 2.99 .00 -.14 .45 .50 .54  
8. CVC investments 0.46 1.51 -.06 .00 .13 .29 .26 .13 
 
 
Table 2a Fixed effects panel estimation results (weighted patent counts) c d 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 WPC WPC WPC WPC 
     
Constant 0.678*** b 0.587** 0.559** 0.713***  
 (0.242)a (0.243) (0.243) (0.245) 
Size 0.113*** 0.118*** 0.119*** 0.0986*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0240) 
R&D intensity 0.113 0.167 0.180 0.105 
 (0.269) (0.268) (0.268) (0.270) 
Technological capital (x1000 patents) 0.366*** 0.392*** 0.404*** 0.313*** 
 (0.0381) (0.0381) (0.0386) (0.0453) 
Non-equity alliances     0.0146*** 
    (0.00396) 
Equity alliances     0.0156* 
    (0.00868) 
M&As    0.0132* 
    (0.00753) 
CVC investments  0.0437*** 0.0764*** 0.0386* 
  (0.0121) (0.0221) (0.0226) 
(CVC investments)2   -0.00365* -0.00170 
   (0.00221) (0.00227) 
     
Wald Chi2 288.63*** 307.90*** 316.27*** 384.37*** 
Log Likelihood 
LR-test 
-4696.84 -4691.39 
10.90*** 
-4689.91 
2.97* 
-4673.28 
33.25*** 
a. Standard errors in parentheses 
b. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
c. Number of observations = 792; Number of firms = 109 
d. Year dummy variables were included but are not shown 
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Table 2b Fixed effects panel estimation results (pioneering, novel and emerging technologies) c d 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 Pioneering 
technologies 
Pioneering 
technologies 
Pioneering 
technologies 
Pioneering 
technologies 
Novel 
technologies 
Novel 
technologies 
Novel 
technologies 
Novel 
technologies 
Emerging 
technologies 
Emerging 
technologies 
Emerging 
technologies 
Emerging 
technologies 
             
Constant -2.099*** -2.029** -2.014** -1.181 0.00662 -0.00782 0.0509 0.557 -2.709*** -2.744*** -2.829*** -2.294*** 
 (0.809) (0.792) (0.785) (0.791) (1.041) (1.038) (1.039) (1.103) (0.703) (0.704) (0.710) (0.737) 
Size 0.418*** 0.404*** 0.400*** 0.300*** 0.354*** 0.352*** 0.344*** 0.287** 0.478*** 0.475*** 0.479*** 0.416*** 
 (0.0921) (0.0901) (0.0892) (0.0884) (0.112) (0.111) (0.111) (0.117) (0.0816) (0.0821) (0.0831) (0.0865) 
R&D intensity 1.111** 1.095** 1.092** 0.806* 0.000879 0.00586 -0.00965 -0.178 1.143** 1.161*** 1.191*** 0.927** 
 (0.459) (0.456) (0.455) (0.458) (0.561) (0.561) (0.561) (0.579) (0.447) (0.448) (0.449) (0.459) 
Technological 
capital (x1000 
patents) 
0.334*** 0.351*** 0.358*** 0.326*** 0.0349 0.0447 0.0622 0.0166 0.295*** 0.329*** 0.387*** 0.333*** 
 (0.0962) (0.0962) (0.0964) (0.103) (0.0990) (0.100) (0.102) (0.101) (0.0608) (0.0622) (0.0640) (0.0675) 
Non-equity 
alliances  
   0.0210***    0.0148**    0.0149*** 
    (0.00623)    (0.00698)    (0.00559) 
Equity alliances     0.0184    -0.0155    0.0256** 
    (0.0143)    (0.0143)    (0.0120) 
M&As    -0.0178    0.00702    -0.0192* 
    (0.0111)    (0.0116)    (0.0100) 
CVC investments  0.0362** 0.0626* 0.0142  0.0123 0.0439 0.0105  0.0375** 0.132*** 0.0773** 
  (0.0177) (0.0328) (0.0189)  (0.0189) (0.0341) (0.0199)  (0.0167) (0.0304) (0.0328) 
(CVC investments)2   -0.00262    -0.00356    -0.0103*** -0.00746** 
   (0.00280)    (0.00326)    (0.00314) (0.00327) 
             
Wald Chi2 99.28*** 105.19*** 106.86*** 140.86*** 29.62*** 30.09*** 31.52*** 35.76*** 104.25*** 108.29*** 126.51*** 186.70*** 
Log Likelihood 
LR-test 
-1404.60 -1402.61 
3.98** 
-1402.17 
0.90 
-1392.51 
19.31*** 
-1273.97 -1273.76 
0.42 
-1273.15 
1.23 
-1271.38 
0.17 
-1550.58 -1548.22 
4.73** 
-1541.97 
12.50*** 
-1531.99 
19.96*** 
a. Standard errors in parentheses 
b. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
c. Number of observations = 763; 788; 766 resp.; Number of firms = 103; 107; 104 resp. 
d. Year dummy variables were included but are not shown 
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Table 3 Combinations of strategies used by focal firms (firm-year observations) 
 (x1, x2 , x3 , x4 )  Total 
None (0,0,0,0) 206 
   
Non-equity alliances (1,0,0,0) 87 
Equity alliances (0,1,0,0) 31 
M&As (0,0,1,0) 79 
CVC investments (0,0,0,1) 8 
   
Non-equity alliances & equity alliances (1,1,0,0) 80 
Non-equity alliances & M&As (1,0,1,0) 61 
Non-equity alliances & CVC investments (1,0,0,1) 10 
Equity alliances & M&As (0,1,1,0) 60 
Equity alliances & CVC investments (0,1,0,1) 0 
M&As and CVC investments (0,0,1,1) 1 
   
Non-equity alliances, equity alliances, & M&As (1,1,1,0) 231 
Non-equity alliances, equity alliances, & CVC investments (1,1,0,1) 11 
Non-equity alliances, M&As, & CVC investments (1,0,1,1) 10 
Equity alliances, M&As, & CVC investments (0,1,1,1) 0 
   
Non-equity alliances, equity alliances, M&As & CVC investments (1,1,1,1) 98 
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Table 4 Fixed effects panel estimation results, using dummy variables for possible combinations of 
strategies c d 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 WPC WPC 
   
Constant 0.594** b 0.656*** 
 (0.254) a (0.242) 
Size 0.105*** 0.102*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0240) 
R&D intensity 0.183 0.128 
 (0.258) (0.262) 
Technological capital (x1000 patents) 0.361*** 0.380*** 
 (0.0411) (0.0389) 
Non-equity alliances  0.0289  
 (0.0828)  
Equity alliances  0.0442  
 (0.125)  
M&As 0.146*  
 (0.0884)  
CVC investments  0.217 0.172 
 (0.322) (0.320) 
Non-equity alliances & equity alliances  0.188**  
 (0.0845)  
Non-equity alliances & M&As 0.326***  
 (0.0915)  
Non-equity alliances & CVC investments  -0.0562  
 (0.211)  
Equity alliances & M&As 0.0980  
 (0.0955)  
M&As & CVC investments  0.396  
 (0.366)  
Non-equity alliances, equity alliances, & M&As 0.296***  
 (0.0786)  
Non-equity alliances, equity alliances, & CVC investments  0.161  
 (0.175)  
Non-equity alliances, M&As, & CVC investments  0.167  
 (0.154)  
Non-equity alliances, equity alliances, M&As, & CVC investments  0.450***  
 (0.0900)  
Other external sourcing modes (non-equity alliances, equity alliances, M&As)  0.135** 
  (0.0563) 
Other external sourcing modes & CVC investments  0.318*** 
  (0.0736) 
   
Wald Chi2 340.43*** 313.51*** 
Log likelihood 
LR-test 
-4676.60 -4687.68 
22.17** 
a. Standard errors in parentheses 
b. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
c. Number of observations = 792; Number of firms = 109 
d. Year dummy variables were included but are not shown 
 
